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This paper analyzes the evolution of reforestation in Brazil and makes an evaluation of federal 
government policies used to stimulate that activity. Despite the huge increase of reforestation areas in 
Brazil since the 1970s, what put up Brazil as the sixth large country with reforested areas in 2000, a 
scarcity of roundwood from reforested area is happing in that country during the first decade of the 21
st 
century. Federal government implemented three programs to foster reforestation in Brazil during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, nothing was implemented during the 1990s, when demand of 
roundwood increased, but not its production. Nowadays, Federal Government recognizes the need of 
stimulating again reforestation in Brazil. This paper analyzes those programs using a traditional cost-
benefit approach. The results of that evaluation are used to suggest new federal government policies to 
foster the enlargement of reforestation in segments where price mechanism has not working well. 
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1 – Introduction 
Despite its huge natural forests and large planted forests, Brazil is suffering, during this 
decade, a scarcity of roundwood, especially a lack of roundwood from planted forests. Due to 
this situation, the study of new policies that are directed to increase the reforestation in Brazil 
(chiefly in segments where price mechanism has not worked well) becomes imminent. However, 
that sort of discussion cannot be driven before evaluating what has been done in the past. 
In relation to that issue, the objective of this paper is to analyze the evolution of 
reforestation in Brazil and evaluate the role of federal policies established in order to stimulate 
that activity. In specific, three programs will be analyzed: the Program of Fiscal Incentives for 
Afforestation and Reforestation, the Program of Reforestation in Small and Medium Farms, and 
the Algaroba Project. These programs had significant impact on the planted forests in Brazil. 
 
2 – The Brazilian Forest Issues 
Despite its huge natural forests (527 million hectares in 2000, according to Cofo, 2001, 
p.34), Brazil’s roundwood production from natural forests has fallen since 1991 (graph 1). In 
1990, 225.61 million cubic meters of roundwood (under the forms of firewood, charcoal, or logs) 
were extracted from natural forests. In 2001, 81.18 million cubic meters had been extracted, with 
  1 64% of reduction in relation to the production reached in 1990. That reduction was the result of, 
on the one hand, enforcement of laws against unsustainable exploitation of natural forests and, on 
the other hand, the exhaustion of natural forests located next to consuming centers. 
 
Insert graph 1 here 
 
At the same time, the roundwood production from planted forests has been increasing. 
This expansion has gone through two phases: from 1974 to 1987 and from 1990 to 1996. 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), that production had a 
significant reduction in 1988 and 1989, and it has been stagnated since 1998. 
Keeping the attention on the time period from 1990 to 2001, an increasing substitution 
from native roundwood to planted roundwood
1 can be noticed. In 1990, the roundwood 
production from planted forests represented 26.8% of the total roundwood produced in Brazil. It 
rose to 58.5% in 2001. 
The expansion of roundwood production from planted forests until middle 1990s is, in 
part, a consequence of the fiscal incentive policies adopted to foster the reforestation in Brazil 
from 1966 to 1988. Graph 2 shows a positive relationship between areas planted with fiscal 
incentives when they are seven year old
2 and the roundwood production from reforestation. For 
example, in the time period from 1974 to 1987 both variables raised, from 1988 to 1990 both 
variables decreased, and from 1991 to 1994 they started to grow again. The correlation 
coefficients between these two variables (roundwood production and annually planted forests at 
the age of their first clearcutting) were 0.848, 0.998, and 0.954, respectively, in these three time 
periods. 
 
Insert graph 2 here 
 
The problem was the reduction of annually planted surface in Brazil during the 1990s. It 
engendered impracticable the continuity of roundwood production expansion at the end of 1990s. 
Graph 3 shows the evolution of the annually planted forests in Brazil sponsored by the main 
roundwood producers (paper and pulp companies, pig iron makers, and small and medium 
farmers
3). From 1993 to 1997, the average of annually planted forests was below the average 
obtained in previous years. The annual average area reforested from 1987 to 1992 was 197.7 
  2 thousand hectares, which decreased to 162.9 thousand hectares per year from 1993 to 1998. 
Beginning in 1999, the annually planted forest acreage is increasing, but that cannot avoid the 
current scarcity of roundwood. 
 
Insert graph 3 here 
 
In part due to the reduction of reforestation acreage during the 1990s, there was a 
decrease in the stock of planted forests as well as the planted tree inventory between 1985 and 
1995 (table 1). In 1985 Brazil had 5.97 million hectares of planted forests, what decreased to 5.4 
million in 1995. That reduction continued until the late of 1990s. Cofo (2001, p. 34) states the 
planted forests were 4.9 million hectares in 2000.  
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Several authors, such as SBS (2000) and Bacha et al (2000), had predicted the scarcity of 
roundwood from planted forests. However, that scarcity was more visible after September 2002. 
From September 2002 to May 2003, roundwood prices rose from 63% to 130%, depending on 
the sort of roundwood and the place where it was sold
4. For comparison, Brazilian inflation was 
11.6% at the same period. 
Advancing that problem, large roundwood consumers, such as pulp industries and pig 
iron makers, enlarged their annually planted acreage since 1999, notably since 2001. However, 
there are a lot of small consumers of roundwood (such as small sawmills, plywood makers, 
pottery mills, bakeries, for example) that do not have enough capital to plant forests. It is not 
sure, one on hand, that pig iron and pulp makers will establish planted forests in order to offer 
roundwood for these small consumers
5; and, on the other hand, large planted forests are not 
placed necessarily near to small consumers of roundwood. 
Due to the current roundwood scarcity in Brazil, which affects primarily small consumers 
of that raw input, it becomes necessary the discussion of policies to foster the enlargement of 
reforestation in that country. Currently, there are social and political demands for these policies, 
especially because neighboring countries (such as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile) have 
been granting these incentives (SBS, 2000). However, the discussion needs to take into account 
what was done in Brazil in the past. 
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3 – The phases of Brazil’s reforestation expansion 
According to Antonangelo & Bacha (1998), the expansion of reforestation in Brazil had 
three phases
6. The first corresponded to the period ranging from the discovery of Brazil to the 
beginning of fiscal incentives granted to reforestation or afforestation projects (it was the period 
from 1500 to 1965). The second phase happened when fiscal incentives were granted to the 
reforestation or afforestation projects, from 1966 to 1988. The third phase was initiated after the 
fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation were finished and no other stimulus 
was granted (from 1989 to 2001). A fourth phase can be added. Beginning in 2002, Federal 
Government recognized the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil and it is trying to implement new 
policies to stimulate reforestation. The following four sections analyzes each phase above 
mentioned. 
 
3.1 – The period before to the fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation
7 
When Brazil was discovered, the destruction of its natural forests started; meantime, few 
reforestations took place until 1965. During that period, the nation watched this process with 
relative passivity. Everything that was implemented in terms of tree plantation and reconstitution 
of Brazil’s forest patrimony was always insignificant in relation to what was done in terms of 
deforestation. 
Until the 1940s, there were mainly pioneering efforts in the introduction of homogeneous 
eucalyptus or pines plantations. A large part of these plantations had scientific or ornamental 
intentions. The main foresters were railroad and paper companies, as well as forest research 
institutes. They established large reforested areas. 
 
3.1.1 – The reforestation in the 1950s and the 1960s 
In 1950, Brazil had a significant inventory of planted forests (1,128,994 hectares). It was 
a result of scientific activities and the pioneering efforts of public agencies, such as the Forest 
Service of the State of São Paulo, as well as from state enterprises, such as the São Paulo’s 
Railroad Company. Moreover, there was a significant growth in the reforestation during the 
1950s. Consequently, the reforested area inventory achieved 2,069,806 hectares in September 1
st, 
  4 1960. However, such performance was reduced in the following decade. At the end of the year 
1970, the inventory of planted forests had dropped down to 1,658,225 hectares. 
 
3.2 - The period of fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation  
Due to fiscal incentives granted to reforestation, Brazilian forestry turned into a new 
phase. It was characterized by: a) an increase in the entrepreneurial activity concerning forestry; 
b) an enlargement of the number of skilled workers working in that activity; c) a great evolution 
of forest science; and, d) a large growth of Brazil’s planted forests. 
In the 1960s, when the forest sector began to be considered with more attention, the 
Brazilian Institute of Forest Development, IBDF, was created (it was founded in 1968, and 
became part of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Natural Resources, IBAMA, in 1989). 
In that decade, the first Forest Engineering Colleges were created and were implemented fiscal 
facilities, which fostered reforestation projects on a wide scale (Antonangelo, 1996). 
 
3.2.1 - Federal policies to stimulate the reforestation in Brazil  
According to Bacha (1993), two basic mechanisms exist to stimulate reforestation: the 
first one is the increasing exploitation cost of natural forests, and the second one is the grants of 
monetary incentives to foster tree plantations, such as subsidized credit, fiscal incentives, and the 
donation of inputs. These incentives act by reducing the cost of homogeneous forest 
implantation. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Brazil’s federal government accomplished three 
programs to encourage reforestation projects. From 1965 to 1988, the Program of Fiscal 
Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) was carried out. In the second half of the 
1970s, a new program to foster reforestation in small and medium farms (REPEMIR) was 
implemented. REPEMIR run until the first half of the 1980s. Finally, from 1985 to 1988, a 
program of reforestation with algarobeira in the Brazil’s northeast arid climate region (the 
Algaroba Project) was executed. 
These three programs resulted in the grants of monetary resources or inputs to agricultural 
producers, who could then carry out reforestation in Brazil. Clearly, subsidies were granted to the 
producers, but their mechanisms of donation were different. 
 
  5 The Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation
8 
The Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) was a set 
of federal normative acts (that included laws, decree-laws, decrees and other norms), elaborated 
from 1965 to 1988, which instituted and regulated the fiscal incentives granted to that activity. 
That kind of fiscal incentive was foreseen previously in the Forest Code on September 15
th 1965 
(Law 4,771), but they were regulated only one year later (by Law 5,106 on September 2
nd, 1966). 
Fiscal incentives occur when an entrepreneur or person who is a taxpayer (named 
taxpayer-investor) destines a share of his income tax to invest in a specific project elaborated by 
another firm, called beneficiary firm
9. In the PIFFR, the same person or group of persons could 
be both taxpayer-investor and beneficiary firm owner. 
Fiscal incentives were granted to establish homogeneous tree plantation, but not 
necessarily woody tree plantation. There were many projects of reforestation that had gotten 
fiscal incentives to plant fruit trees (such as apple, mango, cashew, coconut, and others), palm-
trees,  Prosopis juliflora (“algarobeira”), and bamboo. Table 2 shows the total areas of 
homogeneous forests that should have been planted per year with fiscal incentives and the annual 
areas that should have been planted only with woody tree species (pines, eucalyptus, Angustifolia 
brasiliense, and other trees). There was a great difference between these two areas after 1973, 
which indicates that policy changed in order to stimulate the implantation of trees that were not 
woody species. 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Despite the fiscal incentives for reforestation had been granted up to 1988, no new areas 
for planting were approved in 1987 and 1988. In these years, there were only payments for 
previously approved projects of reforestation. 
There is no agreement about how many fiscal incentives were granted to reforestation 
projects. Table 2 shows two annual series concerning these values. According to the Brazil’s 
Northeast Bank (BNB), in the time period from 1968 to 1988, US$ 10.86 billion (December 1998 
dollars
10) had been granted as fiscal incentives for reforestation projects. That amount of money 
should result in 6,217,723 hectares of tree plantation in the period from 1968 to 1986 (table 2). 
However, some frauds and badly managed plantations had occurred, so that amount of area was 
  6 not totally materialized. Notwithstanding, a significant part of the real expansion in the 
reforestation areas in Brazil during that period was due to the fiscal incentives. 
 
The Program of Reforestation in Small and Medium Farms (REPEMIR) 
The first oil shock in 1973 motivated the Brazilian federal government to create 
mechanisms that saved inputs elaborated from petroleum. Beginning in 1974, the previous 
Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF) searched to implant a program to stimulate the 
reforestation in small and medium farms. The IBDF’s objective was to provide these farmers 
with a source of roundwood, which could be used on their farms or be sold in the form of 
firewood as well as charcoal. The last two alternatives could substitute the energy originated 
from petroleum. The first IBDF’s intention was to create a program based on subsidized loans. 
However, that institute faced restrictions of resources to put in action that intention until the end 
of 1976. In the previous two years, only demonstration projects were established in the Santa 
Catarina and Minas Gerais states (IBDF, 1980, p. 2-3). 
From 1974 to 1976, the Mines and Energy Ministry had been stimulating some economic 
activities to substitute the combustible oil or another derivative of petroleum, as source of energy, 
from the use of firewood or charcoal. However, both public agents (the Mines and Energy 
Ministry and IBDF) had been working independently until 1976. 
On December 30
th 1976, the Inter-ministerial Act number 934 permitted ceramics, pottery 
factories, bakeries and other industries to be free of the obligation to plant the equivalent of 
roundwood that they consume
11. Rewarding that exemption, the National Council of Petroleum 
(CNP) granted resources to the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF). That amount 
of money would be used to foster the reforestation on small and medium farms. 
Using the monetary resources from the National Council of Petroleum, the IBDF 
instituted the Program of Reforestation in Small and Medium Farms (REPEMIR). The objective 
of that program was, according to IBDF (1980, p. 5): 
 
"... to magnify the supply of firewood and charcoal as well as to offer to small and medium 
farmers timber to agricultural buildings, which would have positive impacts in the 
agricultural economy and environment. " 
 
  7 In order to start the REPEMIR, the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF) 
established agreements with the state departments of agriculture. These departments elaborated 
reforestation projects and received monetary resources from IBDF in order to execute them. 
Different schemes of incentive donation occurred in REPEMIR, because each state 
department of agriculture was authorized to elaborate distinct mechanisms to stimulate 
reforestation. The two basic models were: free grants of seedlings, agricultural inputs, and 
technical assistance; or the supply of loans at subsidized interest rates. 
The first version of REPEMIR (based on the free donation of seedlings, agricultural 
inputs, and technical assistance) was executed, for example, in the State of Paraná. The IBDF 
established an agreement with the Paraná’s Department of Agriculture, in the period from August 
1980 to July 1981, with the purpose to plant 2,500 hectares of forests inside farms with total 
surface ranging from 2 to 100 hectares. The minimum requirement for planting should be 1 
hectare per farm and 3 hectares per farm were the maximum-planted areas permitted. In that 
program US$ 84.46 was spent
12 per hectare, which covered the expenses of donation of 
seedlings, insecticide and technical assistance (IBDF-SEAG, 1980). 
In the State of São Paulo, two agreements were established between the Brazilian Institute 
of Forest Development and the São Paulo’s Department of Agriculture with the purpose to foster 
the reforestation in small and medium farms. These agreements had been signed on June 1
st 1978 
and July 6
th 1982, respectively. The scheme adopted in the state of São Paulo was to grant loans 
to farmers whose farms’ total area did not exceed 300 hectares, and for planting at most 20 
hectares per farm (since that amount has been equal or less than 20% of the total surface). These 
loans financed 100% of the project budget (adding 1% of the value of the loan for supporting the 
expenditures with the project elaboration and technical assistance). The interest rate was 18% per 
year, without indexation, and the farmers had eight-year deferment (Bergamasco & Bergamasco, 
1988; and Yamazoe et al., 1988). In order to evaluate that loan conditions, it can be stated that in 
the time period from 1978 to 1982 the annual average inflation rate was 85%. Therefore, it was a 
subsidized loan, with negative real interest rate. 
The REPEMIR was implemented in the state of São Paulo from 1978 to 1983, having 
been benefited 565 farmers and 5,831 hectares were reforested (Yamazoe
13 et al., 1988, p. 4-5). 
According to Bergamasco & Bergamasco (1988) some unexpected incidents happened in that 
program, such as the fact of some farms with more than 300 hectares had used resources from 
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observed in low profitable projects and in projects where seedlings died and were not replaced. 
Unfortunately, there is little information about the monetary resources used in the 
REPEMIR as well as concerning its results. During the Fourth Brazilian Forest Congress (that 
occurred on May 10-15, 1982), the president of the extinct Brazilian Institute of Forest 
Development, Mauro Silva Reis, made the following statement (Reis, 1982, p.15-16): 
 
"The REPEMIR reaches the great part of the Brazilian states, having already been applied, 
until that time, resources that amount Cr$ 400 million. They are sufficient for planting almost 
80 thousand hectares of forests and for the production of 130 million of fast-growing tree 
seedlings. These resources are granted to the state departments of agriculture, which, in turn, 
foster small and medium farmers to plant forests. In the state of Minas Gerais, that program 
has had a great performance. In that state, five agreements were established between the State 
Forest Institute (IEF) and the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF). They sum 
approximately Cr$ 100 million, which is sufficient to plant 18 thousand hectares of forests, 
and to produce 35 million of seedlings." 
 
From the above statement and considering the average Exchange rate in Brazil from 1978 
to 1982 (it was Cr$ 74.01 per US$ 1.00), it can be concluded that the average cost of the tree 
planting in REPEMIR was US$ 67.56 per hectare, considering the period from 1978 to 1982, in 
the whole Brazil. In the state of Minas Gerais that cost was US$ 75.06 per hectare from 1978 to 
1982. According to what was seen before, that cost was USS 84.46 per hectare in the State of 
Paraná in the time period from August 1980 to July 1981. 
In relation to the total reforested area achieved by REPEMIR, there is the following 
affirmation in IPEA/COMIF (1986, p. 91): 
 
"... In relation to the reforestation in small and medium farms, the resources granted by the 
National Council of Petroleum, from 1978 to 1982, were sufficient for implanting from 80 to 
100 thousand hectares of forests. It represented only 1.8% of the total area planted with fiscal 
incentives." 
 
From that statement, it can be concluded that the REPEMIR was little important, in 
relation to the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation, in generating the 
great expansion of the planted forests in Brazil during the 1970s and the 1980s (as showed in 
table 1). 
 
  9 The Algaroba Project 
There are trees that flourish in Brazil’s northeast arid climate region as well as breed 
quickly and supply wood and food to both cattle and human consumption. One of these trees 
belongs to the Prosopis’ genus. Prosopis juliflora (SW) DC, known generically as algarobeira, is 
the most prospect specie that grows in Brazil’s Northeast region. According to Lima (1985, p.30) 
the algarobeira: 
 
"Grows in sandy ground, in regions where rain precipitation varies from 150 to 600 mm 
annually. Its roundwood is used to produce pegs, farm post, firewood, and charcoal. Its broad 
bean, with high protein concentration, is an excellent source of food for both cattle and 
human consumption. "  
 
Given the advantages of the algarobeira, and the advances of technology for processing 
its wood and beans, the Brazilian federal government decided to stimulate its implantation 
through the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation. According to Reis 
(1985, p.34), that program authorized the planting of 93,252 hectares with algarobeira from 1979 
to 1984. It represented 11.9% of the total tree plantations approved by IBDF, using fiscal 
incentives, in the Brazil’s Northeast region in that period. 
Besides the grants of fiscal incentives for planting algarobeira in Brazil’s Northeast 
region, there was another program that was elaborated by the federal government to foster the 
planting of that tree in the same region. It was the Algaroba Project. 
The motivation for establishing that project was the severe drought that occurred from 
1979 to 1983 in Brazil’s Northeast region, and the good performance of the algarobeira in that 
region. The Algaroba Project lasted from 1985 to 1988 and was consisted of the production and 
free distribution of Prosopis juliflora seedlings, grants of free technical assistance, and financial 
support to the farmers placed in SUDENE’s jurisdiction (all Brazil’s Northeast region plus the 
Northern part of Minas Gerais state). 
Resources from FINSOCIAL and BNDES supported the Algaroba Project, and it was 
coordinated by the National Department of Agricultural Production (SNAP), a member of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, with the participation of the Departments of Agriculture from Brazil’s 
Northeast States. According to Silva (1989, p. 23), the Algaroba Project benefited 8.3 thousand 
small agricultural producers, implanting 18.8 thousand hectares of forests in 540 cities of 
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resources used in that project. 
The acreage reforested by the Algaroba Project was small in relation to the one carried 
through the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) in the 
Brazil’s Northeast States. Just in 1985 and 1986, PIFFR granted resources for reforesting 
260,603 hectares in those states
14. 
 
3.3 – Time Period from 1989 to 2001 
From 1989 to 2001, the Federal Government do not conducted any program to stimulate 
the reforestation. The end of federal stimulus, especially the end of fiscal incentives, to plant 
trees at Brazil was first seen as the end of reforestation expansion. But this prediction did not 
show true. From 1987 to 1992, when no fiscal incentive was granted to new reforestation 
projects, annually average of reforested area (197.7 thousand hectares) was near the one reached 
from 1983 to 1986, 204.4 thousand hectares. During this latter period, fiscal incentives were 
granted. It proves that farmers and enterprises could support reforestation expansion in Brazil 
without fiscal incentives. But not as much as it would be necessary in order to avoid roundwood 
scarcity in Brazil (as it was commented at the first section). 
Partially compensating the lack of federal stimulus to reforestations, some states 
governments, mainly the states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Paraná and also large consumers 
of forest raw inputs (such as pulp industry and pig iron makers) have elaborated some programs 
to foster small and medium farmers to reforest fallow areas of their farms. These programs grant 
seedlings and, in some cases, agricultural inputs and technical assistance are also given freely. 
Private and state fomentation programs are very important in terms of reforestation 
expansion. From 1991 to 2001, these programs were responsible for 33 thousand hectares 
reforested annually, which represented 19% of the total surface reforested annually in Brazil at 
the same period. According to BACHA et al. (2000), these programs allowed farmers to yield 
high profits in reforestation projects, especially when these programs offer arrangements to 
farmers not only to make clearcuttings, but also to sell the roundwood. It is the case of the Forest 
Farmer Program in the state of Minas Gerais. Into this Program, small farmers can reach 30% as 
internal rate of return in their reforestations. However, the actual dimensions of those private and 
state programs cannot solve the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil in next few years. 
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3.4 – Time period beginning in 2002 
  In July 2002, Federal Government recognized the threat of roundwood scarcity at Brazil 
and initiates two programs of rural credit to stimulate reforestation: one direct to small farmers 
and other to medium and large farmers. Both programs are based on grants of low interest rate 
loans to plant trees. However, preliminary results suggest they are not reaching their goals. 
  PRONAF-Florestal is a subsidized loan-based program
15 what attends small farmers and 
grants loans sufficient to plant from 2.5 to 4 hectares per farm. From July 2002 to June 2003 was 
allocated resources sufficient to plant around 4 thousand hectares. However, until April 2003, no 
loan was release. This program will be hold next agricultural year, i.e., from July 2003 to June 
2004, when resources will be enough to plant from 13 to 15 thousand hectares. Someone can 
observe that amounts of potential reforested areas are below the amount reached by private and 
state programs (as it was demonstrated at item 3.5). 
  PROPFLOR (Programa de Plantio Comercial de Florestas) was also created in July 2002, 
and it is driven to medium and large farmers. It grants low-rate loans to farmers to plant up to 
100 hectares. There is resource to finance 40 thousand hectares from July 2002 to June 2003, but 
it will not be done
16. The conditions of these loans are more appropriate for large forest firms 
(such as pulp enterprises, wood-based panels producers and pig iron makers), but they are not 
qualified for these loans. 
  It is important to notice that these programs are the same used to stimulate crop expansion 
in Brazil, what have different biological features of tree planting. Moreover, these programs were 
launched without a precise evaluation about the faults of previous programs conducted by 
Federal Government and other alternatives to stimulate reforestation. That evaluation is 
conducted in the following section. 
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It was observed above that fiscal incentive policy had a positive impact on the expansion 
of reforestation in Brazil. However, it is necessary to make a social evaluation of that program. In 
order to fulfill that task, first the implantation costs per hectare between REPEMIR and PIFFR 
are compared. After that, the equitable and distributive effects of the PIFFR are analyzed. 
 
4.1 - Comparing the implantation costs of 1 hectare between the PIFFR and REPEMIR 
Several information exist about the resources used by the Program of Fiscal Incentives for 
Afforestation and Reforestation, but otherwise there is little information concerning monetary 
resources allocated to REPEMIR, and no information about Algaroba Project. Table 3 shows the 
values granted to each hectare in the first two programs, for Brazil and for two specific states. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
The data on Table 3 show that the costs per hectare reforested through the Program of 
Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation were from 10 to 15 times larger than the 
costs faced by REPEMIR. It occurred because REPEMIR subsidized fewer items and for shorter 
duration than PIFFR did. Berger (1979) showed that the Federal Government was granting 
during the 1970s more fiscal incentives per hectare of planted forests than what would be 
necessary. The reason for that, probably, were the influences performed by specific social 
groups
17 that took advantages of fiscal incentives (Soto B., 1992). 
 
4.2 – The evaluation of the equitable and distributive effects in the PIFFR 
Fiscal incentives are a form of indirect subsidy that allows the reduction of implantation 
costs of investment projects. Consequently, a reduction in the production costs of goods and 
services will happen. However, fiscal incentives cause three negative effects: i) they diminish the 
progressive tax rates in the national tariff system, ii) they treat in different forms economic agents 
with the same income, and iii) economic agents who are not taxpayers cannot use that subsidy. 
These negative effects occur with any program of fiscal incentives. Below, some aspects 
of equity loss that happened in the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and 
Reforestation (PIFFR) are analyzed. That program, besides contemplating only the economic 
  13 agents who were income taxpayers (excluding, thus, the great majority of farmers), established, 
several times, minimum sizes for tree plantation that were so large in relation to the average 
surface of Brazil’s farms. As an example, the Decree 79,046 (on December 27
th, 1976) defined 
that the private projects
18 would have 1,000 hectares as a minimum area of tree plantation, except 
for the private project with fruit trees. Later, that minimum size of projects was reduced. 
In relation to the effectiveness aspects, the productive results gotten with the Program of 
Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) must be analyzed, and they must 
also be compared with their costs. From 1968 to 1988, US$ 10.86 billion (December 1998 
dollars) were granted in the form of fiscal incentives for reforestation projects (last column of 
table 2). In part, due to these subsidies, a great growth in the reforested area inventory in Brazil 
occurred. That increased from 1.66 million hectares in 1970 to 5.97 million hectares in 1985 
(table 1).  
However, several projects received fiscal incentives but they did not plant trees. The 
"Report about the situation of the projects authorized by law 5,106" concluded that only 72.2% of 
all reforestation projects approved under the support of that normative act (which had been in 
force from September 2
nd, 1966 to December 31
st, 1976) had been implanted. It corresponded to 
74.3% of the area that should be reforested. Considering only the projects implanted, the same 
report concluded their forestry situations were not good. 
Some projects established tree plantation in areas far away from consuming centers; 
consequently, these reforestation projects became useless. An article from EXAME (1980, p. 32) 
affirmed there was 300 thousand hectares of reforested area located in the state of Mato Grosso 
do Sul and another 400 thousand hectares in the state of Minas Gerais without specific economic 
purpose in 1980. The Brazil’s Federal Accounting Court elaborated another evaluation about the 
economic destination of reforestation areas in March 1985 (PRADO, 1990, p. 10-11). That court 
concluded that 50% of the reforestation areas stimulated by PIFFR, around the whole country, 
were older than the optimum age to be clearcut. Besides, these clearcuttings were unprofitable. 
These situations occurred because there is not a consuming market or because the costs of 
roundwood transportation from these projects to the consuming markets were so large, due to the 
long distances between both. 
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Reforestation 
In competitive markets, as the case of the majority of in nature forest products, the 
equilibrium price is established by the crossing of the supply and demand curves (case of Figure 
1). In other words, the equilibrium price is the one that equals the wishes of consumers and 
producers. 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
In the case of Figure 1, the consumers are paying Po per unit of product consumed. 
However, examining its demand curve (DoDo), it can be observed that consumers would be 
willing to pay a unitary price above Po for quantity less than Qo. That difference, equivalent to 
the area BEPoB, is called consumer surplus, and it represents the difference between what 
consumers effectively pay (equal to the area PoEQo0Po) and the maximum that they would be 
willing to pay (equal to the area BEQo0B). 
Again in Figure 1, it can be observed that producers are receiving Po per unit of product to 
offer Qo. However, for smaller amounts, producers would accept a smaller unitary price than Po. 
Then, producers are receiving the revenue equivalent to the area PoEQo0Po, but the area AEQo0A 
is sufficient for them to offer Qo. The difference between what they receive and what would be 
enough is the area PoEAPo (which is the producer surplus).  
Adding both economic surpluses (consumer and producer surpluses) the total economic 
surplus (equal the area BEAB in Figure 1) is obtained. 
The fiscal incentives have the effect of reducing the production cost, shifting the supply 
curve to the right. When this occurs, an increase in the total economic surplus appears. That 
increase can be understood as a social benefit from the policy that shifts the supply curve to the 
right. The dimensions of the social benefit can be different according to the type of shift in the 
supply curve (if parallel or pivotal). 
In Figure 2, the pivotal shift of the supply curve is showed, i.e., the supply curve was 
shifted to the right, but keeping constant its intercept with vertical axis. The enlargement of the 
total economic surplus is given by area EABCE. 
 
Insert figure 2 here 
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  In Figure 3, the parallel shift of the supply curve of roundwood from reforestation is 
showed. The enlargement of the total economic surplus is given by area EABCFE. 
 
Insert figure 3 here 
 
The increase of the economic surplus is a measure of the total social benefit that came 
from fiscal incentives granted to stimulate reforestation. 
To measure the Total Social Benefit (TSB), the following equations can be used 
(according to LINDNER & JARRET, 1978; and, ROSE, 1980): 
  TSB = 0.5 K P0 Q0 (1+Zε
 d)      (1)          for the pivotal shift of the   
        supply  curve     
or   
  TSB = 0.5 K P0 Q0  (2+Zε
 d)      (2)    for the parallel shift of the   
         supply  curve     
 
Where:  
P0 and Q0 are the price and quantity of equilibrium for roundwood from reforestation, 
respectively, before the grants of fiscal incentives. 
ε
 d = price-elasticity of the demand for roundwood from reforestation (in absolute value); 
ε
 s = price-elasticity of the supply for roundwood from reforestation;  
K = is the size of supply curve shift (see figures 2 and 3) and it is measured by the proportional 
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  Taking the point (Q
s
2t, P0) in Figure 2, the price-elasticity in the supply curve (ε
 s) can be 
calculated using:  
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  Equation (5) shows that K can be measured by the proportional change in the production 
divided by the price-elasticity of supply (ε
s). Therefore, in order to calculate K it is necessary to 
have an estimate of the supplied product before and after the grant of fiscal incentive and keeping 
the price in P0.  
  To calculate the price-elasticity of the demand and supply for roundwood from 
reforestation (ε
 d and ε




D =  ao +  a1 L PMPt +  a2 L PMNt +  a3 L Rt ⋅⋅ ⋅
t
t
            (6) Demand equation 
L QMPt
S =  b 0 +  b 1 L PMPt +  b2 L IFt-5 b3 L QMPt-1
S ⋅⋅ + ⋅           (7) Supply equation 
Where: 
QMPD = quantity demanded of roundwood from reforestation at the time t. 
QMPS  = quantity offered of roundwood from reforestation at the time t. 
QMPt-1
S  = quantity offered of roundwood from reforestation at the time t−1. 
PMPt = price of one unit of roundwood from reforestation at the time t. 
PMNt = price of one unit of roundwood from natural forest at the time t. 
Rt = Gross Domestic Product at the time t. 
IFt-5 = the amount of fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation at the time t−5. 
 
  Equation (6) is a traditional demand equation. The determinants of quantity demanded of 
roundwood are its price, the price of substitute goods, and the income of consumers. Otherwise, 
in equation (7) the determinants of quantity offered of roundwood are its price, the fiscal 
incentives granted in the past to foster the reforestation, and the previous production of 
  17 roundwood. This last variable represents the effect of productive capacity of planted forests on 
the current production. 
  L indicates that the variable has its value taken in logarithm. So, the price-elasticity can 
be obtained directly from the equations (6) and (7), respectively. 
  The signs expected for the coefficients of equation (6) and (7) are: a1 < 0  , a2 > 0 ,  a3 > 
0,  b1 > 0 ,  b2 > 0  e b3 > 0. It is known that ε
 d = |a1|  and  ε
 s = b1. 
  The two-stage least square method was used to estimate the demand and supply equation 
of roundwood from reforestation [equation (6) and (7)]. The RATS was the program used. 
  Firewood quantities and prices have been used as proxy for quantity and price of 
roundwood from reforestation, respectively. These information and others that are necessary to 
estimate equations (6) and (7) are on table 4. Data set is for the period
20 from 1971 to 1990. 
During that period, the effect of fiscal incentives on the roundwood production happened. If a 
more recent data set is used, the values of ε
 d e ε
 s would be different. 
 
Insert table 4 here 
 




D =   -15.16694      -3.107283⋅L PMPt    + 2.914099⋅L PMNt    + 4.263626⋅L Rt                   (8) 
                       (-2.8372)*       (-1.0388)****             (1.1845)****              (6.4621)* 
 
             R-squared = 0.7106                   number of observations = 20                Q(10) = 6.9962
ns 
   
 
L QMPt
S =    2.806303      +  1.798338⋅L PMPt    + 0.003404434⋅IFt-5   + 0.00003379⋅QMP        (9)   t-1
S
                      (1.1499)****     (1.9365)**                  (2.785)*                      (1.7081)*** 
 
             R-squared  = 0,7482                    number of observations = 20              Q(10) = 13.346
ns  
 
Where: the subscript * indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level; **, significant at 5%; ***, 
significant at 10% level; ****, significant at 25% level; n/s, not significant; s/a, without residual auto-
correlation; 
 
  According to equations (8) and (9), ε
 d = 3.107283  and  ε
 s = 1.798338.  
  18   The value of K is calculated per year, and a different value of Q
S
2t for each year is 
obtained. Considering 1971 as being the period zero, the following equation is used to calculate 
Q
S
2t per year: 
 
L QMPt




S =    6.8755898    + 0.003404434⋅IFt-5   + 0.00003379⋅QMP                                          (11)  t-1
S
 
  In equation (10), 9.61 is the price per unit of roundwood at the time zero (it is Po). So, 
using the equation (11) it is possible to measure the shift of supply curve of roundwood due to 
fiscal incentives. 
Using the different annual values of Q
S
2t , obtained from the equation (11), and the annual 
data of the Pt and IFt-5 (according to Table 4), the annual values of K are calculated (these values 
are put on Table 5). The latter are used together the values of price-elasticity of demand (ε
 d) and 
supply (ε
 s) in order to calculate the values of Z (also put on Table 5). 
 
Insert table 5 here 
 
Finally, using the annual values from 1972 to 1990 of K and Z, and also using ε
 d, P0 and 
Q0, the annual values of the total social benefit generated by fiscal incentives are calculated. Two 
different estimates are obtained: considering a pivotal shift of the supply curve, and a parallel 
shift of that curve (these values are on Table 5).  
According to the values from Table 5, it can be observed that the values of social benefit 
each year were generally less than the value of social cost. For the entire period from 1972 to 
1990 the social benefits
21, considering the pivotal shift, were US$ 15.49 million and according to 
the parallel shift, those benefits were US$ 25.97 million (December 1998 dollars). However the 
social costs of the fiscal incentives
22 amounted to US$ 9.77 billion (December 1998 dollars).  
  From the above information, it can be concluded
23, first, the Program of Fiscal Incentives 
for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) had, in the best situation, US$ 389.69 as social cost 
per US$ 1.00 as social benefit (December 1998 dollars). Second, significant part of monetary 
resources granted by PIFFR was invested in other activities not attached to the reforestation. 
  19 Third, the number of firms and farmers awarded with fiscal incentives was limited due to the 
minimum area size established to approve the reforestation projects.  
 
4.2.2 – The Distribution of resources among the beneficiary firms 
As already commented, just the income taxpayers had been able to apply for deduction 
and application of fiscal incentives. Due to it, the majority of the farmers (who do not pay income 
tax in Brazil) had not been able to assume the position of the taxpayer-investor. Moreover, the 
available information suggests that the most part of beneficiary firms was not also agricultural 
producers. 
According to IPEA/COMIF(1986, p. 94-96), from 1971 to 1982 roughly 53% of the total 
reforested area stimulated by fiscal incentives had belonged by only 99 beneficiary firms. Among 
these firms, about 40% were subsidized enterprises of other companies operating in sectors as pig 
iron, paper and pulp, lumber and wood-based panels, and production of energy. Among these 99 
beneficiary firms there is a concentration in relation to fiscal incentives received. The 10 largest 
companies of reforestation, among the 99 large beneficiary firms, had been responsible for 24.5% 
of the total reforested area established by those beneficiary firms. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation had 
benefited, in a larger ratio, large firms, which in many times were subsidiaries of other 
companies operating in activities where the forest raw material is used as an input in the process 
of production. Consequently, wealth concentration happened among companies located in Brazil, 
because part of them could invest share of their income tax as capital investment in their 
subsidiary firms.  
 
5 – Conclusions 
The reduction of the annual average area of homogeneous reforestation from 1993 to 
1997 resulted in a scarcity of roundwood production from planted forests in Brazil during the 
first decade of the 21
st century. That situation put in a high position the discussion about new 
policies to foster the enlargement of reforestation in Brazil. 
The fiscal incentives to the reforestation had a positive effect on the homogeneous 
reforestation expansion from 1966 to 1986, but its social costs were very large in relation to its 
social benefits. The ample grants of fiscal incentives resulted in a bad use of them. Low interest 
  20 rate loans to stimulate reforestation were tried in the past and they are tried nowadays. Alike as it 
happened in the past, the results of these loans are small in terms of reforested areas. Otherwise, 
federal and state experiences in the promotion of reforestation in small and medium farms since 
the 1990s have been showed an alternative with low costs per reforested hectare. However, the 
dimensions of these programs are not sufficient to solve the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil in 
the next few years.  
Fomentation programs consisted of the donation of seedlings and, some times, 
agricultural inputs and technical assistance are offered freely. The case of the Forest Farmer 
Program in the state of Minas Gerais showed that kind of reforestation program has allowed the 
farmers to make larger profit when the industrial firm gives the adequate support to the farmers 
during the clearcutting of forest, and in the commercialization of the roundwood. In addition, the 
reforestation in small and medium farmers does not result in land ownership concentration like 
the large reforestation does. 
Basing on the above showed, new policies centered in the promotion of reforestation in 
small and medium farms can be suggested to solve the roundwood scarcity in Brazil. The free 
donation of seedlings, agricultural inputs (as insecticides) and technical assistance has low cost 
per reforested hectare and also presents larger social return than the use of fiscal incentive. 
However, these programs need to be followed by some mechanisms that give to farmers an 
adequate support during the clearcutting of forests, and in the commercialization of the wood to 
be produced. 
It can appear at the first glimpse an out-of date proposal to give new stimulus to plant 
forests in Brazil. However, this impression is not true. First, the price mechanism is not solving 
the current scarcity of roundwood. Second, the government would work together to consumers of 
roundwood in order to make farmers more sensible to the signals of market. Third, there is social 
demand for new reforestation policies, especially because they exist in other South American 
countries. Forth, increasing the offer of roundwood, new industrial activities would be held, and 
social benefits such as the enlargement of income and job will happen. 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Brazil and IBGE homepage
 
          Note: roundwood is the total equivalent of firewood, charcoal and logs 
 
 
Graph 2 - production of roundwood and planted forests (7 years old 




















































































































































                Source: data set from IBDF and IBGE. 
 
 
  25 Graph 3 - Minimum annual planted forests with wooden trees in 






































































































Table 1 – inventories of planted forests and number of growing trees in Brazil (stock variables) 
  12/31/70 12/31/75 12/31/80 12/31/85  12/31/95* 
Planted forests in hectares  1,658,225  2,864,298  5,015,713  5,966,012  5,396,016 
Number of reforested trees (thousand)  2,585,984  5,371,340  9,227,460  9,690,493  7,065,381 
Source: Agricultural Census of Brazil 
Note:  * that area was computed in 12/31/95 and the number of trees was computed in 07/31/96. The number of trees 
includes all planted species and the data was collected from the CD-ROM of Agricultural Census. That value 
is larger than the similar one that exists in printed edition of the same Census. This is because the printed 




  26 Table 2 – Monetary resources and area that should be reforested with fiscal incentives in Brazil 



















1967    34,760    34,587  65.70   
1968 102,910  100,178  276.47       19.28 
1969 162,383  160,985  172.07       67.11 
1970 222,005  220,002  447.84     128.22 
1971 248,478  239,029  506.08     308.46 
1972 304,357  284,704  551.17     345.08 
1973 294,153  261,677  560.17     423.79 
1974 324,379  282,915  415.69     522.87 
1975 398,240  329,449  436.70     473.63 
1976 449,249  358,685  617.16     831.99 
1977 346,432  295,238  724.05     995.33 
1978 411,737  370,732  894.55  1,193.96 
1979 473,718  401,924  820.95  1,434.32 
1980 435,575  360,400  686.96     818.17 
1981 417,875  347,185  713.03     711.54 
1982 430,985  345,655  675.06     673.97 
1983 215,000  164,830  490.15     499.04 
1984 286,200  195,610  378.61     365.59 
1985 285,032  196,654  337.20     338.77 
1986  409,015  260,540       427.49 
1987           248.17 
1988              31.64 
Source: BACHA (1993 and 1995). 
 
 
Table 3 – Amount of money granted to stimulate the reforestation of 1 hectare in the Program of Fiscal 
Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation (PIFFR) and in the Program of Reforestation 
in Small and Medium Farms – Brazil and two specific states 
Region  Period  PIFFR (US$ nominal 
per hectare)* 
REPEMIR (US$ 
nominal per hectare)** 
Brazil  1978 to 1982  659.06  67.56 
State of  Minas Gerais  1978 to 1982    75.06 
State of Paraná  1980 to 1981  1,266.45  84.46 
SOURCE: (*) files of IBDF. 
              (**) These values were commented in the paper. 
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Figure 1 – Equilibrium in roundwood market 
                where: PMP is the price of stereo of roundwood from planted forest e QMP  
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Figure 2 – Pivotal shift of the supply curve 
      Where: SoSo is the supply curve before the grant of fiscal incentives 
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Figure 3 – Parallel shift of the supply curve 
      Where: SoSo is the supply curve before the grant of fiscal incentives 




  28 Table 4 – Data set used to estimate demand and supply equations of roundwood from reforestation 
Year QMPt (in 
thousand of 
cubic meters) 








Rt  (in billion 
of December 
1998 dollars) 




1971          194.01  9.61  5.70  262.86             0 
1972          914.82  11.19  6.64  300.68         65.70 
1973       4,313.69  12.77  7.57  386.40  276.47 
1974 22,958.54 14.51  8.60  437.18  172.07 
1975 30,011.42 16.00  9.49  481.43  447.84 
1976 28,190.81 14.57  8.64  530.74  506.08 
1977 30,603.85 12.85  7.62  567.63  551.17 
1978 34,412.17 13.29  7.72  593.73  560.17 
1979 35,972.38 15.45  8.36  635.57  415.69 
1980 30,961.06 12.41  7.40  663.00  436.70 
1981 30,248.48 11.07  6.32  619.35  617.16 
1982 28,564.39 10.16  6.34  644.89  724.05 
1983 25,486.68 9.84  5.86  581.50  894.55 
1984 26,680.80 8.26  5.42  587.24  820.95 
1985 37,587.21 8.53  5.29  677.59  686.96 
1986 46,404.16 8.80  7.10  740.96  713.03 
1987 45,908.07 13.80  6.89  718.77  675.06 
1988 23,361.43 12.21  6.36  685.11  490.15 
1989 23,622.90 20.81  16.57  709.07  378.61 
1990 22,738.54 9.80  4.72  642.46  337.20 
SOURCE: QMPt, PMPt, PMNt and Rt are from Statistical Yearbook of Brazil and IFt−5 is from IBDF (see 
table 2). 
 
  29 Table 5 – total social benefit (TSB) and total social cost (TSC) in the Program of Fiscal Incentives for 
Afforestation and Reforestation 










TSC (in million 
of December 
1998 dollars) 
1972 0.4675704 0.1714054  668.03  1,103.91  65.70 
1973 0.5139255 0.1883985  759.55  1,238.64  276.47 
1974 0.5024625 0.1841963  736.50  1,204.90  172.07 
1975 0.5449406 0.1997683  823.34  1,331.34  447.84 
1976 0.5488527 0.2012024  831.53  1,343.18  506.08 
1977 0.5494869 0.2014349  832.86  1,345.10  551.17 
1978 0.5501853 0.2016909  834.33  1,347.22  560.17 
1979 0.5476087 0.2007463  828.92  1,339.41  415.69 
1980 0.5485971 0.2011087  830.99  1,342.41  436.70 
1981 0.5512811 0.2020926  836.63  1,350.55  617.16 
1982 0.5526605 0.2025983  839.53  1,354.73  724.05 
1983 0.5540498 0.2031076  842.46  1,358.96  894.55 
1984 0.5531905 0.2027926  840.65  1,356.34  820.95 
1985 0.5517064 0.2022485  837.53  1,351.84  686.96 
1986 0.5533073 0.2028354  840.90  1,356.70  713.03 
1987 0.5537358 0.2029925  841.80  1,358.00  675.06 
1988 0.5516164 0.2022155  837.34  1,351.56  490.15 
1989 0.542126 0.1987365  817.47  1,322.85  378.61 
1990 0.5401562 0.1980144  813.37  1,316.91  337.20 
SOURCE: the values of K, Z and BST were calculated basing on LQ2 equation and using data set from 
table 4. The values of TSC are from table 2 
. 
                                                 
1  That wood is in the forms of firewood, charcoal and logs. 
2 That is the age when normally trees are clearcut to produce chips. However, in some Brazil’s regions it is 
possible to make the first clearcutting when forest is five year old in order to produce firewood. 
3 It was considered the reforestation made in small and medium farmers fostered by public programs in 
Minas Gerais and Paraná states, special programs in the state of São Paulo and those stimulated by pulp 
and pig iron makers. The small and medium reforestation fostered by other enterprises and states as well 
as the reforestation established by small and medium farmers without any incentive could not be 
computed. 
4 This information refers to roundwood sold at the state of São Paulo. Prices of firewood had large 
increase than prices of pulpwood, for example. 
5 Bacha (2003) showed pulp industries and pig iron makers decide how much to plant considering their 
demands of logs more than the prices of roundwood. 
6 Due to the importance of fiscal incentives to the reforestation, Leite (1979) had considered, at the end of 
1970s, two phases in the evolution of Brazil’s forest sector: before 1965 and after 1965. Here, we add to 
the Leite’s division a new phase, what started after the end of fiscal incentives granted to the 
reforestation. 
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7 There are some papers that have analyzed partially the forest activity in that period. See: Andrade 
(1961), Cianciulli (1954), Gurgel Filho (1962), Pereira (1990), Prates (1979) and Siqueira (1990). 
8  Some authors have already analyzed that program. See, for example: Arienti (1983), Bacha (1993 e 
1995), Beattie (1975), and Berger (1979). 
9 When a taxpayer was filling his income tax report, he informed the Tax Revenue Service about the 
amount of his income tax that would be allocated to a specific project. After the taxpayer had paid his 
income tax balance, the Tax Revenue Service allocated the authorized amount to the beneficiary firm. 
The latter then issued a Reforestation Certificate (a title of property) to the taxpayer-investor. 
10 It is important to say there was a valorization of Brazil’s currency from December 1992 to December 
1998. So, the selection of different times in order to calculate the amount of resources granted as fiscal 
incentive can produce significant differences. Example given is the same value calculated considering 
purchasing power of the currency in December 1992, it was US$ 7.05 billion (according to BACHA, 
1995, p. 51). 
11  This obligation was established by 1965 Forest Code (Law 4,771). 
12  It was spent Cr$ 6.000,00 per hectare. Considering the average of Exchange rate in the period from 
August 1980 to July 1981 (Cr$ 71,04 per US$ 1.00) the value above is obtained. 
13 Differences exist between Bergamasco & Bergamasco (1988, p. 89) and Yamazoe et al. (1988) about 
the number of projects and total area achieved by REPEMIR in the state of São Paulo. In this paper, 
Yamazoe et al. (1988) data set was chosen because these authors made a research and Bergamasco & 
Bergamasco (1988) based on that research to prepare their article. 
14  That information is from IBDF’s files. 
15 It offers loans at 3% interest rate per year with 8-year deferment and 12 years to pay the loan. That 
interest rate is below Brazil´s inflation rate. In 2002, inflation rate was 25% in Brazil. 
16  No loan was granted in 2002. 
17 It is important to point out that during the 1960s, 1970s and the first half of the 1980s there was a wide 
use of fiscal incentives to promote economic activities in Brazil. It implied a subsidy virus argument. 
18 Article 18
th in Decree 1,376 (on December 12
th, 1974) regulated it. In that case of project, both 
taxpayer-investor and beneficiary firms have the same owners. 
19  These equations were estimated using the quantities and prices of firewood. So, the lag of five years 
was considered between the time of forest implantation and the time of its first clearcutting. It is the 
minimum time lag demanded to produce firewood after the reforestation had been implanted. 
20  This paper uses that time period because it reflects the period when fiscal incentives were granted.  
21  These values are sub-estimates of the true social benefits because in this paper only roundwood from 
the first clearcutting of planted forest are being taken into account. 
22  Actually, these fiscal incentives were granted from 1967 to 1985, but their effect on the supply curve 
has arisen from 1972 to 1990. 
23 It is important to point out that the model used here [equations (1) and (2)] do not take into 
consideration other social benefits provided by reforestation, such as job creation and enlargement of 
industrial activity (the case of pulp production, for example). 
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